¿Afecta la discreción de la gerencia al vencimiento de la deuda en las firmas chilenas? Un enfoque al costo de las agencias y a la información asimétrica - Núm. 43, Julio 2016 - Revista Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 656163389

¿Afecta la discreción de la gerencia al vencimiento de la deuda en las firmas chilenas? Un enfoque al costo de las agencias y a la información asimétrica

AutorJorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo
Páginas66-87
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 20 | No. 42 | 2016
ISSN 1657-4206 e-ISSN 2462-8107 Vol. 20 No. 43 PP. 65-87 DOI:10.17230/ecos.2016.43.4
Research Article
doeS Managerial diScretion affect debt Maturity
in chilean firMS?
an agency coSt and aSyMMetric inforMation aPProach
¿Afecta la discreción de la gerencia al vencimiento
de la deuda en las firmas chilenas? Un enfoque al
costo de las agencias y a la información asimétrica
Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendozaa*, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpob
Abstract
We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose
information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE).
Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth
opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a decision
that contributes to reducing liquidity risk. For firms with low growth oppor-
tunities, managerial discretion does not aect debt maturity, while external
monitoring reduces it. These results provide new evidence for international
literature. Other conclusions suggest that debt maturity is positively related
to firm size, capital structure, and asset tangibility and negatively related to
agency costs and belonging to business holdings. These findings support
international studies.
Resumen
Abordamos los determinantes de la madurez de la deuda de las empresas chilenas
utilizando datos, cuya información se extrajo de la Encuesta Longitudinal de
Empresas (ELE). Los resultados de las regresiones agrupadas de Tobit indican
que para las empresas con altas oportunidades de crecimiento, la discreciona-
lidad gerencial estimulará plazos de deuda más largos, decisión que contribuye
a reducir el riesgo de liquidez. Para las empresas con bajas oportunidades de
crecimiento, la discrecionalidad gerencial no afecta la madurez de la deuda,
mientras que la supervisión externa la reduce. Estos resultados proporcionan
nueva evidencia para la literatura internacional. Otras conclusiones sugieren
que el vencimiento de la deuda está relacionado positivamente con el tamaño
Key words: Debt maturity, agency
costs, ownership structure,
managerial discretion, monitoring.
Palabras clave: Vencimiento
de la deuda, costos de agencia,
estructura de propiedad, discreción
gerencial, monitoreo.
JEL classification: G31, G32, G33
Received: 19/11/2016
Accepted: 11/12/2016
Published: 14/12/2016
a, b. Department of Business Management,
University of Concepcion, Chile
* Principal contact for correspondence:
jormunozm@udec.cl
PP 67 | 91
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 20 | No. 43 | 2016
Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
de la empresa, la estructura de capital y la tangibilidad de los activos; y está relacionado negati-
vamente con los costos de la agencia y la membresía en una compañía de cartera. Estos hallazgos
son consistentes con estudios internacionales.
1. Introduction
Decisions on debt terms have been widely researched in recent corporate finance literature. A large
part of documented evidence shows that debt maturity is positively related to firm size and regula-
tions, but inversely related to growth opportunities and ownership concentration, among other factors.
Transversely, a factor that also influences debt term is managerial discretion. Managerial discre-
tion should be understood as the opportunist behavior of the manager, who can make decisions for
personal benefit, rather than in favor of the company, and its owners. These behaviors can increase
the risk of bankruptcy for the company. The managerial discretion has been mainly considered by
using agency theory and information asymmetries.
Costs associated with managerial discretion aect financing policies and terms. Theoretical and
empirical literature has shown that firms adjust their capital structure to debts in response to higher
agency costs (Jensen, 1986). This fact becomes more relevant when managerial discretion takes place
in larger, ineicient firms with low growth opportunities and low debt firms.
Such an eect also influences debt term decisions. Companies with high agency costs usually
reduce debt maturity periods to mitigate overinvestment. Reducing debt terms disciplines adminis-
trators, making debt payment a priority over asset accumulation under their control (Leland, 1998;
Lasfer, 1999; Ozkan, 2000; Jiraporn and Tong, 2008; Alcock et al., 2011). Endogenously, this form of
financing policy reduces managerial discretion.
The degree of discretion and its eect on debt maturity can also be seen through the asymmetric
information theory. A greater degree of asymmetric information promotes opportunistic behavior by
managers, generating conflicts of interest and in turn aecting company credit quality (Ross, 1977).
This fact can increase the liquidity risk or default probability (Flannery, 1986).
Most studies focus on developed markets such as those in the United States and Europe. Howe-
ver, in emerging markets, and specifically in Chile, evidence is sparse, and the eect of managerial
discretion on debt maturity is still an unexplored subject.
In Chile, access to financing by companies is heterogeneous, mainly respect to the debt maturity
contracted. On the one hand, mature and long operating history firms have access to the markets of
bank debt and fixed incomes, which are usually contracted in the long term. Although these compa-
nies are characterized by low growth opportunities, financing appears to be explained more by the
composition of their assets and diluted ownership structure. According to data from the Longitudinal
Business Survey (ELE), these companies would not represent more than 20% of Chile's universal bu-
sinesses. On the other hand, companies with greater growth options are generally subject to greater
operational risk and a limited pool of assets, which restrict debt from a purely bank and short-term
source. This type of debt in many cases leads these companies towards a high liquidity risk that,
afterwards can lead to bankruptcy.

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