Bringing the Structure Back in: Limited Access Orders, 'Extreme' ISI and Development - Núm. 68, Abril 2019 - Revista de Estudios Sociales - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 777660765

Bringing the Structure Back in: Limited Access Orders, 'Extreme' ISI and Development

Autor:Mona Lyne
Cargo:Ph.D. in Political Science, University of California (San Diego), United States. Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at University of Missouri-Kansas City, United States. Latest publications: 'Rethinking the Political Economy of Import Substitution Industrialization in Brazil: A Clientelist Model of Development Policymaking
Páginas:27-37
RESUMEN

Structuralists highlighted politico-economic constraints on late development and advocated infant industry policies. In practice, highly distortionary implementation choices were near ubiquitous. Why did policymakers prefer this extreme policy? Employing North, Wallis & Weingast (2009), I argue politicians were constrained by a limited access order (LAO) to directly distribute production rights... (ver resumen completo)

 
EXTRACTO GRATUITO
Bringing the Structure Back in: Limited Access Orders,
“Extreme” ISI and Development *
Mona Lyne **
Received date: May 21, 2018 · Acceptance date: October 29, 2018 · Modication date: February 23, 2019
https://doi.org/10.7440/res68.2019.03
How to cite: Lyne, Mona. 2019. “Bringing the Structure Back in: Limited Access Orders, ‘Extreme’ ISI and Development”. Revista
de Estudios Sociales 68: 27-37. https://doi.org/10.7440/res68.2019.03
ABSTRACT | Structuralists highlighted politico-economic constraints on late development and advocated
infant industry policies. In practice, highly distortionary implementation choices were near ubiquitous. Why
did policymakers prefer this extreme policy? Employing North, Wallis & Weingast (2009), I argue politicians
were constrained by a limited access order (LAO) to directly distribute production rights to powerful groups.
“Extreme” ISI policies maximized politicians’ ability to directly distribute production rights; a milder policy
meant replacing state-conferred rights with market mechanisms. I review representative “extreme” policies
in Brazil, Chile and India, and then demonstrate their political ecacy in diversifying production rights that
could be directly exchanged for elite support. Finally, I discuss the argument’s consistency with early structur-
alist emphasis on underlying politico-economic conditions as impediments to growth.
KEYWORDS | Economic development; import substitution; infant industry; limited access order; patron-client
networks; structuralism
Reintroducir el estructuralismo: órdenes de acceso limitado, ISI “extrema” y desarrollo
RESUMEN | Los estructuralistas han hecho énfasis en las limitaciones político-económicas del desarrollo tardío
y han defendido las políticas de industria incipiente. En la práctica, las apuestas de implementación altamente
distorsionadoras fueron las más extendidas. ¿Por qué optaron por esta política extrema los responsables de
formular políticas públicas? Con base en los planteamientos de North, Wallis y Weingast (2009), sostengo
que los políticos estuvieron sujetos a las limitaciones de un orden de acceso limitado (LAO) para distribuir
directamente los derechos de producción a grupos poderosos. Las políticas “extremas” de la ISI maximi-
zaban la capacidad de los políticos para distribuir directamente los derechos de producción; una política más
moderada implicaba reemplazar los derechos conferidos por el Estado por mecanismos de mercado. Repaso
algunas políticas “extremas” representativas en Brasil, Chile e India, y luego demuestro su ecacia política
para diversicar los derechos de producción, de tal manera que pudieran intercambiarse directamente por el
apoyo de las élites. Finalmente, planteo la coherencia del argumento con el énfasis estructuralista inicial que
señalaba las condiciones político-económicas subyacentes como impedimentos para el crecimiento.
PALABRAS CLAVE | Desarrollo económico; estructuralismo; industria incipiente; orden de acceso limitado;
redes patrón-cliente; sustitución de importaciones
* Paper presented at the workshop “Revisiting Latin America’s Industrial Policy and Industrialization in the Twentieth Century”, held
at Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá, Colombia) in May 2017.
** Ph.D. in Political Science, University of California (San Diego), United States. Associate Professor at the Department of Political
Science at University of Missouri-Kansas City, United States. Latest publications: “Rethinking the Political Economy of Import
Substitution Industrialization in Brazil: A Clientelist Model of Development Policymaking”. Latin American Politics and Society 57 (1):
75-98, 2015; The Voter’s Dilemma and Democratic Accountability: Latin America and Beyond. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2008. * lynem@umkc.edu

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