The priority of propositional justification
| Autor | Erhan Demircioglu |
| Cargo | Departamento de Filosofía, Koç University, Estambul, Turquía |
| Páginas | 167-182 |
Estud.los nº 59. Enero-junio de 2019. Universidad de Antioquia. pp. 167-182.
ISSN 0121-3628. ISSN-e 2256-358X
* This paper is a product of the author’s ongoing research on the nature of epistemic justication funded
by Koç University.
Cómo citar este artículo:
MLA: Demircioglu, Erhan. “The priority of propositional justication”. Estudios de Filosofía 59 (2019): 167-182.
APA: Demircioglu, E. (2019). The priority of propositional justication. Estudios de Filosofía, 59, 167-182.
Chicago: Erhan Demircioglu. “The priority of propositional justication”. Estudios de Filosofía n°. 59 (2019): 167-182.
The priority of propositional justication*
La prioridad de la justicación proposicional
Por: Erhan Demircioglu
Departamento de Filosofía
Koç University
Estambul, Turquía
E-mail: erdemircioglu@ku.edu.tr
Fecha de recepción: 30 de abril de 2018
Fecha de aceptación: 4 de agosto de 2018
Doi: 10.17533/udea.ef.n59a08
Abstract. Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional
and doxastic justication, according to which (Basis) it is sucient for S to be doxastically justied
in believing p that p is propositionally justied for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes
p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong.
Turri oers “an alternative proposal,” the denitive thesis is that the subject’s intellectual abilities
explain why a given proposition, p, is justied for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this
proposal leads to explaining propositional justication in terms of doxastic justication rather
than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think
that Turri misidenties “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misres, (ii) even if we as-
sume that Turri’s identication of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view
are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox
view but can be accommodated by it.
Keywords: epistemic justication, propositional justication, doxastic justication, the epistemic basing
relation, John Turri.
Resumen. Turri argumenta en contra de lo que él llama una visión “ortodoxa” de la relación entre la
justicación proposicional y doxástica, según la cual (Basis) para que S esté doxásticamente
justicado al creer que p es suciente que p esté justicado proposicionalmente para S en virtud
de tener una razón R y que S crea que p sobre la base de R. Según Turri, (Base) es falsa y, por
lo tanto, la opinión ortodoxa es errónea. Turri ofrece “una propuesta alternativa”, cuya tesis
denitiva es que las habilidades intelectuales del sujeto explican por qué una proposición dada,
p, está justicada para ella, y argumenta que, en contra de la ortodoxia, esta propuesta lleva a
explicar la justicación proposicional en términos de justicación doxástica en lugar de viceversa.
Erhan Demircioglu
168
Estud.los nº 59. Enero-junio de 2019. Universidad de Antioquia. pp. 167-182.
ISSN 0121-3628. ISSN-e 2256-358X
En este documento, deendo las siguientes armaciones: (i) Hay buenas razones para pensar que
Turri identica erróneamente “la visión ortodoxa” y, por lo tanto, su objeción falla, (ii) incluso
si asumimos que la identicación de Turri de la visión ortodoxa es correcta, sus contra-ejemplos
de esa visión distan mucho de ser decisivos, y (iii) la propuesta de Turri no es “una alternativa”
a la visión ortodoxa; esta puede ser acomodada por ella.
Palabras clave: justicación epistémica, justicación proposicional, justicación doxástica, la relación
de base epistémica, John Turri.
1. Introduction
An adequate theory of epistemic justication must be able to account for the
dierences in the epistemic standings of the subjects in the scenarios below:
Case 1. Last night in her dream, it seemed to Susan as if she were reading an article about
a civil war in Iraq. Other than this experience, she is entirely clueless about what is actually
going on in Iraq, and Susan does not (come to) believe that there is a civil war in Iraq.
Case 2. John reads an article about a civil war in Iraq in a newspaper that is well-known
for its credibility. However, he simply ignores the information he receives from the article
and does not come to believe that there is a civil war in Iraq.
Case 3. Michael reads an article about a civil war in Iraq in a newspaper that is well-known
for its credibility. Michael comes to believe that there is a civil war in Iraq; however, the
reason for which he believes that there is a civil war in Iraq is not his having read that
article but his having had a dream similar to Susan’s last night.
Case 4. Mary reads an article about a civil war in Iraq in a newspaper that is well-known
for its credibility. Mary comes to believe that there is a civil war in Iraq, and the reason for
which she believes that there is a civil war in Iraq is her having read that article.
In cases 1 and 2, neither Susan nor John believes that there is a civil war in
Iraq. However, John is, epistemically speaking, better situated with respect to the
proposition that there is a civil war in Iraq than Susan. It might plausibly be said
that John’s epistemic credentials for the proposition that there is a civil war in Iraq
are better than Susan’s. While neither has the belief in question, we might still say
that John has something going for the proposition that there is a civil war in Iraq
but Susan does not. Examples of this sort can be easily found in the literature, and
they are usually deployed to draw the moral that we need a notion of epistemic
justication that applies to pairs of subjects and propositions, regardless of whether
those subjects believe the corresponding propositions or not; and let us adopt the
schema A proposition, p, is (epistemically) justied for a subject, S to articulate the
epistemic relation intended to be captured by this notion. So, the proposition that
Para continuar leyendo
Solicita tu prueba